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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

TORTS-PROXIMATE CAUSE-SUPERSEDING CAUSE

Three defendants, the Standard Oil Company, Parker, their
lessee, and Powell, a contractor, negligently removed an underground storage tank and allowed a large quantity of gasoline to
spill and flow on a city street. The fire department was summoned. After the street had been washed, a fireman at the direction of the fire chief touched a lighter to the street to test the
effectiveness of the washing. The resulting fire damaged plain-
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tiff's automobile. The trial court held Standard, Parker, Powell,
the fireman and the fire chief liable.1 Upon appeal by defendants
Standard, Parker and Powell2 to the Supreme Court of Kansas,
held: Affirmed. The act of the fireman in touching his lighter
to the pavement was not so unrelated to the negligent spilling of
the gasoline as to constitute the sole proximate cause of the fire.
The negligent spilling of the gasoline and the touching of the
lighter to the pavement were both proximate causes of the fire
and the damage.3
It has frequently been recognized that there may be more
than one proximate cause of an injury.4 In most jurisdictions the
first wrongdoer, even though his act has merely set the stage on
which the second wrongdoer contributes to the plaintiff's injury,
is no longer relieved from liability. The courts argue that the
second negligent act is merely a means by which the first wrongful act becomes harmful.5 One of the tests in delimiting liability
in such a case is whether the later negligent act was itself foreseeable.6 Thus, it is generally held that a defendant will not be
relieved of liability by an intervening force7 which could reasonably have been foreseen, or by an intervening force which is a
normal incident of the risk involved.8

However, it is a well established principle that the rules
with respect to proximate cause and substantial factors producing
1 Demurrers by Standard, Parker and Powell that the petition did not
disclose facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action were overruled.
2 Appealed on the grounds that the trial court erred in overruling the
demurrers in that it must have been concluded as a matter of law that
any negligence with which they were charged was not the proximate
cause of the damage sustained and that the proximate cause was the intervening acts of the firemen.
3 Trapp v. Standard Oil Company, 176 Kan. 39, 269 P.2d 469 (1954).
4 Waterloo Savings Bank v. Waterloo, Cedar Falls & Northern R.R ..
60 N.W.2d 572 (Ia. 1953); Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klass, 217
Miss. 795, 65 So.2d 575 (1953); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Sutton, 208
Okl. 488, 257 P.2d 307 (1953).
5 Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 263 P.2d 287 (Utah 1953); Bohlen,
Fifty Years of Torts, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1225, 1229 (1937).
6 See note 5 supra.
7 "An intervening force is one which actively operates in producing
harm to another after the actor's negligent act or omission has been committed." Restatement, Torts § 441 (1934).
s Long v. Crystal Refrigerator Co .. 134 Neb. 44, 277 N.W. 830 (1938);
Nelson v. William H. Ziegler Co., 190 Minn. 313, 251 N.W. 534 (1933);
l\Iagay v. Clafin-Sumner Coal Co., 257 Mass. 244, 153 N.E. 534 (1926);
McClure v. Hoopeston Gas and Electric Co., 303 Ill. 89, 135 N.E. 43
(1922).
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the harm are liniited by those with respect to superseding9 intervening causes.10 In applying the test of foreseeability to such
intervening causes, the court in the much quoted case of Kline
'l'. Moyer 11 drew a clear cut distinction between two classes of
cases. The first situation is where one has negligently created a
dangerous condition and a later actor becomes aware of the dangerous condition but negligently fails to avoid it. The second
situation involves conduct of a later intervening actor who negligently fails to observe the dangerous condition until it is too
late to avoid it. The original actor is relieved of liability in the
first situation but held liable in the second. The reasoning in the
first situation is that it is not reasonably to be foreseen that one
who actually becomes cognizant of a dangerous condition in ample
time to avert injury will fail to do so. This rule has been followed
in many jurisdictions12 and is in accord with the Restatement.13
In the instant case the original actors knew that they had
been negligent in allowing the gasoline to spill and that someone

9 "A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which
by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing
about." Restatement, Torts § 440 (1934).
10 Medved v. Doolittle, 220 Minn. 352, 19 N.W.2d 788 (1945).
11325 Pa. 357, 191 Atl. 43 (1937).
12 Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 263 P.2d 287 (Utah 1953); Zeloszewski v. Sloan, 375 Pa. 360, 100 A.2d 480 (1953); Edgerton v. Norfolk
Southern Bus Corp., 187 Va. 642, 47 S.E.2d 409 (1948); Medved v. Doolittle, 220 l\Iinn. 352, 19 N.W.2d 788 (1945); Johnson v. Cone, 112 Vt.
459, 28 A.2d 384 (1942).
13 In a footnote in Kline v. Moyer it was pointed out that the conduct
was "extraordinarily negligent" within the rule laid down in Restatement,
Torts § 447c (1934), which provides that, "The fact that an intervening
act of a third person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another which the
actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if ..•
the intervening act is a normal response to a situation created by the
actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily
negligent." And in comment e of § 447, the Restatement continues. "The
words extraordinarily negligent denote the fact that men of ordinary experience and reasonable judgment, looking at the matter after the event
and taking into account the prevalence of that 'occasional negligence, which
is one of the incidents of human life,'. would not regard it as extraordinary
that the third person's intervening act should have been done in the negligent manner in which it was done. Since the third person's action is a
product of the actor's negligent conduct, there is good reason for holding
him responsible for its effects, even though it be done in a negligent
manner, unless the nature or extent of the negligence is altogether unusual.''
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might be injured by a resulting fire. Had a pedestrian without
knowledge of the situation thrown a lighted match into the danger
area, there would be little doubt as to liability. However, to
prevent such an injury the original actors summoned an instrumentality trained to cope with such a dangerous condition and
whose duty it was to prevent such an injury. Yet that very instrumentality with knowledge of the dangerous condition negligently set the spark which turned the original actor's negligence
into a blazing inferno.
Had the original actors not relied upon the training and experience of the firemen, they no doubt would have taken their
own corrective measures by guarding the dangerous area. Since
it is generally agreed that there are at least some limits to the
tort liability of a negligent defendant and that the law does not
make a negligent defendant an insurer against every possible
future contingency, it would appear that the rule adopted in the
first situation of the Kline case is a reasonable and proper approach to the rules of superseding causes and one which should
be applicable to the instant case.
Marvin L. Holscher, '56

